Identity, enlightenment and political dissent in late colonial Spanish America by McFarlane, Anthony
 University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap 
 
This paper is made available online in accordance with 
publisher policies. Please scroll down to view the document 
itself. Please refer to the repository record for this item and our 
policy information available from the repository home page for 
further information.  
To see the final version of this paper please visit the publisher’s website. 
Access to the published version may require a subscription. 
Author(s):  Anthony McFarlane 
Article Title:  Identity, Enlightenment and Political Dissent in Late 
Colonial Spanish America 
Year of publication: 1998 
Link to published article: http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3679300 





IDENTITY, ENLIGHTENMENT AND POLITICAL
DISSENT IN LATE COLONIAL SPANISH AMERICA
By Anthony McFarlane
READ 27 SEPTEMBER 1997 AT THE INSTITUTE OF HISTORICAL RESEARCH,
LONDON
DURING the long crisis of the Spanish empire between 1810 and 1825,
the Creole leaders of Spanish American independence asserted a new
identity for the citizens of the states which they sought to establish,
calling them 'Americanos'. This general title was paralleled and often
supplanted by other political neologisms, as movements for inde-
pendence and new polities took shape in the various territories of
Spanish America. In New Spain, the insurgents who fought against
royalist government during the decade after 181 o tried to rally fellow
'Mexicans' to a common cause; at independence in 1821, die Creole
political leadership created a 'Mexican empire', the title of which, with
its reference to the Aztec empire which had preceded Spain's conquest,
was designed to evoke a 'national' history shared by all members of
Mexican society. In South America, die leaders of the new republics
also sought to promote patriotic feelings for territories which had been
converted from administrative units of Spanish government
into independent states. Thus, San Martin and O'Higgins convoked
'Chileans' to the cause of independence in the old Captaincy-General
of Chile; shortly afterwards and with notably less success, San Martin
called upon 'Peruvians' to throw off Spanish rule. Bolivar was, likewise,
to call 'Colombians' to his banner in die erstwhile Viceroyalty of New
Granada, before advancing south to liberate Peru in die name of
'Peruvians', and Upper Peru in die name of 'Bolivians', where die
Republic which his military feats and political vision made possible was
named after him.
Here, it seems, were signs of Latin American nationalism. Indeed,
one of principal dieses in Benedict Anderson's influential work on
nationalism is diat its origins are found in the New World during die
late eighteendi and early nineteendi centuries, and not in Europe, as
Eurocentric analysts have for so long insisted.' Anderson acknowledges
mat die traditional explanations of the rise of nationalism do not work
' Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism
(2nd ed., London and New York, 1991), xiii.
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for Latin America: language was not an issue, the independence
movements did not stem from the middle classes, nor bring mobilisation
of the lower classes. Nonetheless, he insists that Latin American
independence were national independence movements because, in
colonial provinces which usually contained large, lower-class, non-
Spanish-speaking populations, the Creoles who led the movements
against Spain 'consciously redefined these populations as fellow-nation-
als'.2 Why, Anderson asks, were conceptions of the nation found so
early among the Creole communities of Spanish America, and why did
the Spanish empire quickly break down into a number of separate
states?
Proceeding from his definition of the nation as an 'imagined political
community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign',3
Anderson argues that, prior to independence, Creoles throughout the
different regions of Spanish America had formed an image of their
communities that was to be conducive to the construction of nation-
states. In his view, Creoles were able to conceive of national communities
because their long experience of Spanish colonial rule had imbued
them with a sense of identity based in specific territories. In the first
place, die experience of Creole colonial functionaries had long fostered
a sense of separate identity, different from diat of metropolitan Spaniards
and linked to the particular territories in which Creoles served as
officials; secondly, the spread of print-capitalism to die colonies during
die late eighteendi century provided die Creoles widi anodier, stronger
means of envisaging diemselves as communities separate from Spain,
while also providing a medium for inventing and experiencing a 'public'
interest. From here, Anderson argues, it was a short step to claim that
diese communities should be sovereign, and the occasion arose when
die Spanish monarchy collapsed under die pressures of revolution and
war in Europe. This is not, of course, intended as an explanation of
die origins of independence movements in Spanish America; it aims,
radier, to explain why die Spanish American empire divided into states
which, because diey were based on notions of nationality, proved to be
'emotionally plausible and politically viable'.4 Nonetheless, because
Anderson insists diat die construction of Creole identity was a crucial
element in shaping Spanish American independence, his arguments
provide a good starting-point for discussing die issues considered in tiiis
paper: namely, die origins and character of Creole identity under
Spanish rule, its relationship to political change before independence,
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Consider, first, Anderson's observation that the experience of Creole
officials—what he calls the 'pilgrimages of Creole functionaries'—
nurtured a sense of Creole identity that was not only different from that
of metropolitan Spaniards but also associated with the territory created
by the administrative entity within which Creole officials moved. This
is a very useful observation. For it goes beyond the conventional view
that Creole desire to hold offices simply generated a negative identity
which derived its meaning solely from resentment against metropolitan
Spaniards, and focuses instead on the way in which the Creole experience
of office-holding within a confined territory provided a positive identi-
fication with a specific territorial community, and thus later allowed
Spanish administrative units to be reconceptualised as American 'father-
lands' capable of commanding an emotional attachment and loyalty. It
is, however, also an oversimplified and perhaps misleading account of
the ways in which Creole cultural identity was both formed and fixed
to a particular territory. The confinement of Creoles to lateral movement
within an official habitat that was territorially cramped (compared to
the wider horizons of transient metropolitan officials who moved from
colony to colony, and colony back to metropolis) was by no means die
sole, nor even die most important, way in which Creoles found dieir
identity and identified with particular territories. As David Brading and
odiers have shown, die development of 'creole patriotism' had deeper,
more complex origins and characteristics, arising from die fundamental
dualism of American identity—European or native—that stemmed
from the Spanish conquest of indigenous peoples.5
The sense of cultural difference between Spaniards in America and
mose in Europe was present from die first years of settlement. It arose,
first, from the cultural diversity of Spain itself, as Spanish immigrants
brought to America dieir regional and cultural identities as Galicians,
Catalans, Aragonese, Navarrese, Andalusians and so on. Indeed, it has
even been said diat die early sixteendi-century chronicles and mission-
ary works on Indian cultures were 'creole in spirit' because diey
expressed die difference felt by diose of long residence and experience
in die New World from newly arrived Europeans. To be 'creole' in this
early American world was not necessarily to be born in America, but
simply to be physically and culturally acclimatised to it. The conquerers'
sense of difference from Europeans was, moreover, underpinned by
dieir view of tiiemselves as die architects of new kingdoms who deserved
to be treated as a feudal aristocracy comparable to diat of Spain, in
return for dieir services to die crown in bringing new lands under its
sovereignty. The disappearance of die conquest elite eroded such claims,
5
 For an early, key essay on creole patriotism, see David A. Brading, Los origenes del
naaonalismo mexkano (Mexico, 1978).
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but Creole elites continued to see diemselves as landed nobles who, as
die societies and economies in which they lived developed in ways
which set them apart from Spain, had rights to political autonomy in
dieir own lands.6
The Creole elites' sense of affinity with a particular land and patria
was both expressed and reinforced by Creole writers who sought to
meet Creole needs for a cultural personality that was separate from, but
comparable to that of Spain. Throughout Spanish America, especially
in Mexico, a tradition of Creole writing emerged during the seventeendi
and eighteenth centuries to meet dais need, through the construction
of histories which mydiologised die Indian past and die creation of
religious cults which claimed diat America and its peoples held a special
place in the plans of Divine Providence.7 Creoles also drew on Hispanic
political traditions to advance dieir claims to parity widiin die Spanish
world by drawing on the conception, derived from die theory and
practice of government in Habsburg Spain, of die Spanish monarchy
as a cluster of kingdoms which were united under a single, Cadiolic
king, but which retained dieir own identities and forms of government.
Thus, Castile, Aragon, die Nedierlands and so on were regarded as
separate kingdoms, each widi a distinctive history and culture, different
customs, laws and Jueros, and a territorial nobility with claims to govern
under the overarching sovereignty of die king.8 This image of die
Spanish monarchy as a combination of kingdoms was used by die
American elites to stake dieir own claims to identity and autonomy.
They professed to be nobles descended from die Spanish conquerers
and settlers whose services to die crown had made possible die creation
of American kingdoms—in Peru, New Granada, Quito, Chile and so
on—and, by die same token, diey claimed rights to hold die offices of
Church and State in die lands brought under Spanish rule by dieir
forebears. These ideas enabled American Spaniards to see diemselves
as part of die Spanish 'nation', but distinct from it. They were politically
separate from Spain's kingdoms in Europe, but united by political ties
to die same monarch; dieir social milieux and customs made diem
culturally different from Spain, but shared edinicity, language and
religion also bound diem to the modier country.
6
 Anthony Pagden, 'Identity Formation in Spanish America' in Colonial Identity in the
Atlantic World, 1500-1800, ed. Nicholas Canny and Anthony Pagden (Princeton, 1987), 51-
93. Also Bernard Lavalle, Las promesas ambiguas: criottismo colonial en los Andes ( l ima, 1993),
passim.
7
 David A. Brading, The First America: The Spanish Monarchy, Creole Patriots and the Liberal
State, 1492-1867 (Cambridge, 1991), 292-390; Jacques LaFaye, Quetzalcoatl and Guadahpe:
The Formation of Mexican National Consciousness, 1531-1813, trans. B. Keen (Chicago and
London, 1976), esp. 51-98; 177—253.
8
 John L. Phelan, The Kingdom of Quito in the Seventeenth Century. Bureaucratic Politics in the
Spanish Empire (Madison, Wisconsin, 1967), 120.
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The underpinnings of Creole patriotism were, then, those of an ancien
regime society. An aristocratic conception of society and a Hispanocentric
conception of ethnic hierarchy gave the Creole elites a sense of them-
selves as a ruling class by reason of their noble, Spanish descent. The
History and Genealogies of the Kingdom of Mew Granada, written by Florez de
Ocariz in 1672, reflects this clearly. To establish his credentials as a
member of the nobility in Bogota, Florez asserted that he descended
directly from a Spaniard who had participated in the conquest of New
Granada more than a century earlier. The nobility he defined as men
who descended from the conquistadors and nobles who had settled
New Granada, and who thus had rights to occupy the prime position
in society and to provide the dignatories and officers of state which the
crown appointed through the king's patronage.9 like their counterparts
in Europe's nobility and gentry, members of leading American families
found a primary identity in claims to nobility which conferred not only
prestige but also the right to privileged access to public office.
Creole belief in, and identification widi, regional patrias did not,
however, promote the concept, vital to nationalism, of one 'people'
within the territorial patria. In the first place, this was a Creole patriotism,
and it was predicated on the belief, implanted at the time of Spanish
conquest, that American societies were ordered in a racial hierarchy in
which whites occupied the top position. Under Spanish rule, social
identities in the Indies were shaped primarily by the Hispanocentric
conception of the American social order as a sequence of three major
ethnic groups, with espanoles (Spaniards and their descendants) in the
first rank, and Indians and Africans in positions of legal and cultural
inferiority. This simple social order became increasingly complicated
over the centuries, as the three primary groups were supplemented by
intermediate groupings of people of mixed ethnic origin: the mestizos
born of Spanish-Indian mixture; the mulattos of Spanish-black mis-
cegenation; the zambos who came from Indian-black unions. By the
eighteenth century, the clarity of the system of ethnic categorisation
had also been blurred by the Hispanicisation of these subordinate
groups. Especially in the urban environments of the more economically
developed regions, they became more like each other in language and
culture, and, by die same token, more like the Hispanic elites who
dominated colonial societies. This trend towards ethnic convergence
was reflected in the censuses taken in die late eighteenth century, which
enumerated whites or espanoles, Indians, slaves (or blacks), but employed
the generic term of 'castas' to include all odier groups formed from
9
 On Florez de Ocariz, see Juan A. and Judith E. ViMamarin, 'The Concept of Nobility
in Colonial Santa Fe de Bogota' in Karen Spalding (ed), Essays in the Political, Economic
and Social History of Colonial Latin America (Newark, Delaware, 1982), 125—50.
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ethnic fusions.10 The early schema of ethnic classification thus tended
to lose its simplicity and clarity, and identification based on supposed
biological criteria gave way to ascription defined by local social criteria.
Difference defined by birth and blood nonetheless remained an import-
ant marker of social standing, since ethnic origins had important
practical implications for individuals, especially at the upper and lower
ranges of the social order. Indians had to pay tribute and, together
with blacks, were not treated equally under the law. Mestizos and
mulattos found their origins were a bar to education in the universities
and thus to entry into the professions, and to membership of cor-
porations regarded as the exclusive preserve of espanoles. Conversely,
Spanish descent conferred a superior status, opening opportunities to
education, to office-holding, the professions, and the priesthood. In
short, being espanol brought legal as well as social privilege, and Creole
concern to protect this status, which intensified with the blurring of
barriers and changes in Spanish law, precluded identification with the
wider population."
The evolution of Creole patriotism into a sense of nationality was
also impeded by the character of American political life. According to
Anderson, Creole involvement in government at the level of the audi-
encias, with their wide territorial jurisdictions, fostered among Creoles
the concept of a distinct American identity and the sense of a territorial
patria. But it is doubtful that this conception of community extended
very far beyond small groups of high-ranking Creole officials and the
equally small Creole intelligentsia with which it overlapped. For most
Creoles, experience of government and politics was at the less exalted
level of town and city administration. Unlike North American colonials,
Spanish Americans had no representation in regional assemblies, and,
aside from the few who were rich enough to secure offices at the
regional level, Creole political horizons and experience were largely
confined to the jurisdictions of urban centres. This did not prevent
them from having a lively political life, with a much higher degree of
participation than was once supposed. Far from slumbering in a long
'"For a general analysis of these phenomena, James Lockhart, 'Social organisation and
social change in colonial Spanish America' in Cambridge History of Latin America, (Cambridge,
1984), II, 265-319; for studies of this process set in two colonial cities, see John K.
Chance, Race and Class in Colonial Oaxaca (Stanford, Calif, 1978), 144-85, and Martin
Minchom, The People of Quito, 1690-1810: Change and Unrest in the Underclass (Boulder, San
Francisco and Oxford, 1994), 158-90. On the blurring of ethnic and race divisions in
colonial Peru, see David Cahill, 'Colour by Numbers: Racial and Ethnic Categories in
the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1524—1824', Journal of Latin American Studies, 26 (1994), 325-46.
"On Creoles' concern to protect their superior status against encroachments from
people of colour, see Jaime Jaramillo Uribe, 'Mestizaje y differentiation social en el
Nuevo Reino de Granada en la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII', in his Ensayos sobre
Historia Social Colombiana (Bogota, 1968), 163—233.
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'colonial siesta', the inhabitants of Spanish American cities, towns and
villages had an intense political life in which both patricians and
plebeians participated actively, which often involved the assertion of
village, town and city autonomy, and which did not involve identification
with a broader region.12
The intense localism of Creole politics was reflected in die fact mat,
until the eighteenth century, regional challenges to royal government
were few and far between; unlike the rebellions of the Catalans,
Portugal, Sicily and Naples in the mid-seventeendi century, American
protests had no nationalist or separatist undertones.13 Nor, unlike die
Catalans, did Spanish Americans take advantage of die crisis of
succession at die start of die eighteendi century to press dieir own
political agendas. Throughout die War of Succession, diey remained
loyal to die monarchy and allowed a smoodi, largely unquestioning
transition from die Habsburg to die Bourbon dynasty. Creoles' con-
sciousness of pertaining to a patria should not, dien, be confused widi
separatist or nationalist aspirations; it referred only to die quasi-
aristocratic rights to die prerogatives of local office which members of
Creole elites claimed to possess, and was perfecdy compatible widi
universal monarchy. The 'creole patriotism' reflected in die literature
and culture of colonial elites reflected a cultural effort to resolve die
dilemmas faced by whites who felt bodi Spanish and American: it was
a quest for an identity which would reconcile die 'civilised' world of
Europe widi die 'barbarism' of die New World. Advances in diis quest
were, however, widiout any clear political counterpart at die end of
die seventeendi century. Creole intellectuals had created histories which
legitimated dieir cultural identity, even to die point where die Mexican
creole Carlos de Siguenza y Gongora affirmed die existence of a 'creole
nation' rooted in pre-Hispanic Mexican civilisation. But diis was a
fragile construct: after the uprising of Indians and castas in Mexico City
in 1692, Siguenza y Gongora fell silent, and interest in rooting creole
cultural identity in an historic, etiinic past were not revived for decades.'4
Creoles might have identified widi a patria of dieir birth and residence,
11
 For examples of local political life, see Anthony McFarlane, 'Civil Disorders and
Popular Protest in Late Colonial New Granada', Hispanic American Historical Review, 64:1
(1984), 17-54; a ' s o Margarita Garrido, Reclamosy representacimes: Variaciones sobre la politico
en el Mem Reino de Granada, iyyo-1815 (Bogota, 1993), 116-225; a n d Oscar Cornblit, Power
and Violence in the Colonial City: Oruro from the Mining Renaissance to the Rebellion of Tupac
Amaru, 1740-82 (Cambridge, 1995), 37-80.
'
3
 For a brief comparison of rebellions in the seventeenth-century Spanish monarchy,
see Anthony McFarlane, 'Challenges from the Periphery: Rebellion in Colonial Spanish
America' in Rebelimy Resistenda en el Mundo Hispanico del Siglo XVII, ed. Werner Thomas
and Bart de Groof (Leuven, 1992), 250-9.
14
 Anthony Pagden, Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination (New Haven and
London, 1990), 97.
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but diis was by no means inconsistent with holding another identity as
a member of die Spanish 'nation', die source of dieir common descent.
Affirmations of Creole identity were cultural, not political, and did not
envisage an existence outside the Spanish monarchy. This was a
development which arose only late in die eighteenth century, when
colonial societies were affected by significant changes to dieir social,
political, and intellectual environments.
How, dien, did Creole cultural identity become politicised? According
to Anderson, die crucial catalyst was die advance of print-capitalism
during die later eighteendi century. Widi die publication of colonial
newspapers, he argues, die Creoles' sense of an identity rooted in a
particular territory became sharper and, with exposure to Enlighten-
ment ideas, capable of conversion into die 'imagined communities'
which became die basis of die nation-states which replaced Spain's
empire in die early nineteendi century.'5 It is true, as we shall see, diat
new ideas and new means to receive and disseminate diem played a
key role in politicising and territorialising die Creole sense of identity
forged in previous centuries. But this, again, was a more complex
process dian Anderson's summary argument allows, and did not lead
ineluctably towards the expression of Spanish American nationalisms.
The development of a deepening sense of Creole identity was bound
up, first, widi die impact of changes in Spanish imperial policy in
societies whose elites felt a growing sense of self-confidence in an era
of demographic and economic expansion, and resented the modernised
imperialism of die Bourbons, which aimed at turning Spain's American
dominions into dependent satellites run in die interests of the metro-
politan power.'6 When die Bourbon dynasty succeeded the Habsburgs
at die start of die eighteendi century, it inherited an American empire
which depended for its government on die active co-operation of
American-bom Spaniards. Not only did die Creole gentry dominate
local government dirough the municipal corporations, but diey had
also penetrated the royal bureaucracy at many levels, including die
upper echelons of die church and die benches of the audiencias (high
courts) which were die foremost expression of royal authority in most
regions of die Indies.'7 Thus, aldiough Habsburg kings did not formally
recognise die rights of die American-born to political office and
15
 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 62—5.
16
 Colin MacLachlan, Spain's Empire in the New World: The Role of Ideas in Institutional and
Social Change (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1988), pp. 67-88.
17
 On Creole penetration of the royal bureaucracy, Mark Burkholder and D. S. Chandler,
From Impotence to Authority: The Spanish Crown and the American Audiencias, i6gy~i8o8 (Colombia,
1977); on Creole elites in local government, see Peter Marzhal, Town in the Empire:
Government, Politics and Society in Seventeenth-Century Popayan (Austin, Texas, 1978).
IDENTITY, ENLIGHTENMENT AND POLITICAL DISSENT 317
autonomy, political practice had allowed Creoles to take a substantial
share of power, particularly within local government. This in turn
fostered the Creole belief in a pact under which the Creoles were entitled,
by reason of their place of birth, to control local affairs under the
overarching authority of the Spanish king. While the Habsburg mon-
archy had implicitly accepted that Creoles should play a part in their
own administration, Bourbon ministers took a different view. Early in
the century, they began to try to reverse the 'Americanisation' of
colonial government, and in so doing drew on old stereotypes which
portrayed Creoles as inferiors who were congenitally incapable of
administering their own affairs. The official Spanish identification of
the Creole 'other' tended to reinforce and politicise the Creoles' sense
of separate and distinctive identity in two ways. It encouraged Creoles
to embrace their American identity by forcing them to defend it (being
caused by birth, creoleness was a condition which could not be escaped,
but only defended); secondly, treatment as the 'other' encouraged
Creoles to use this identity in their political disputes with Spaniards and
with Spanish governments.
A clear reflection of the revival of the Creole 'odier' in official
metropolitan circles as a means of both explaining the ills of government
in the Indies and justifying closer metropolitan control is found in the
famous memorandum which Jorge Juan and Antonio de UUoa sub-
mitted to the crown following their mission to Peru in the 1740s. In it,
they reported that a growing gulf divided European Spaniards and
Creoles:
In Peru, it is enough to be a European . . . to declare oneself
immediately against Creoles. To be born in the Indies is sufficient for
one to hate Europeans. This mutual antipathy reaches such an
extreme that in some ways it exceeds the unbridled fury of two
nations, completely at odds, who vituperate and insult each other.
But if the differences between nations are finally resolved, this is not
the case widi the whites in Peru. Despite better lines of com-
munication, the welding of kinship bonds, and other good reasons
for being conciliatory, united and friendly, discord increases all the
time.18
To explain this antagonism, Juan and Ulloa offered an analysis which
reflected the disdain for Creoles felt in metropolitan official circles. The
conflict, they argued, had causes which were attributable to the Creole
characteristics of 'excessive vanity, presumption and pride'. The
problem with the Creoles was that their 'vanity dissuades them from
lSJorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, Discourse and Political Reflections on the Kingdoms of
Peru, trans. John J. TePaske and Besse A. Cement (Norman, Oklahoma, 1978), 217.
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working and becoming traders, the only occupation in the Indies
capable of maintaining a consistent standard of living', and thus led
them into the 'innate vices associated with a licentious, slothful exist-
ence'. Spanish immigrants, on the other hand, used enterprise and
hard work to amass fortunes, to escape their humble origins, and to
become political leaders in their communities. This caused great
jealousy, Juan and Ulloa argued, because Creoles failed to understand
class distinctions. Creoles believed that the Spaniards had prestige and
should be well-treated simply because they were from Europe. They
therefore went out of their way to help metropolitan Spaniards who,
'because of some disadvantages of birth or upbringing, would not have
the opportunities to make their way out of their humble position', were
they still in Spain. This, in turn, encouraged Spaniards in the Indies
'to raise their goals to a very lofty plane'. Jealous of such social mobility,
Creoles ridiculed these metropolitan parvenus for their lowly social origins;
Europeans then took revenge on Creoles 'by throwing in their faces the
defects of the exaggerated nobility they boast so much about'.'9
These observations were of course coloured by traditional metro-
politan prejudice against die American-born, and by the proclivity of
educated, well-born and condescending metropolitans to dismiss col-
onials as benighted provincials.20 The comments made by Juan and
Ulloa are nonetheless interesting in two respects. On the one hand,
they reflect the extent to which metropolitan Spaniards had constructed
a stereotypical image of American-born whites which consisted largely
of negative characteristics and was applied indiscriminately to all
Creoles. On the other hand, by portraying Creoles and metropolitans
as people widi different attitudes and modes of behaviour, Juan and
Ulloa also draw attention to the real part which differences in cultural
norms played in generating and perpetuating conflict. For, when
Spaniards like Juan and Ulloa talked of Creole 'vanity, presumption and
pride', they were simply belitding the Creoles' awareness of themselves as
a social elite whose position rested on certain canons of behaviour and
demanded recognition and respect. Equally, what seemed to immigrant
Spaniards to be their just reward for enterprise, hard work and thrift
was to Creoles an unfair intrusion into social and political arenas which
they believed to be the rightful preserve of the American-born gentry.
And when Spaniards disparaged the Creoles' excessive concern with
genealogy, diey failed to recognise that such concern was not simply
frivolous, but reflected claims to the political primacy which American
19
 Quotations from Juan and Ulloa, Discourse and Political Reflections, pp. 218-22.
"For an assessment of Antonio de Ulloa, the report's principal author, and the
continuity of his writing with the Spanish imperial tradition of commentary on America,
see Brading, The First America, 424-8.
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social elites believed to be just rewards of their nobility. This Juan and
Ulloa ignored. They simply called for control to ensure that only the
right kind of metropolitans were able to take office in Peru, through a
system of licensing.21
Seen from a Creole perspective, such portrayals were infuriating, and
led Creoles, not just to insult and vituperate the Spaniards in order to
satisfy their rancorous souls (as Juan and Ulloa scornfully observed),22
but to defend their Creole identity and to invest it with political meaning.
A striking and eloquent example of such a politicised defence of Creole
identity, coupled with a striking rebuttal of the crass stereotypes used
to justify discrimination against Creoles, is found in the celebrated
petition submitted by the Mexico City council to the king in 1771.
Written by Antonio Joaquin de Rivadeneira, a Creole lawyer who had
been a judge on bench of the Mexican Audiencia, the petition was
prompted by a report in which a prominent metropolitan official said
of Creoles that, 'if raised to authority or office, they are prone to the
greatest errors', and so recommended Creole exclusion from any but
'positions of the middle rank'. In response, Rivadeneira commented
bitterly that this was another shot in 'a war we have suffered since the
discovery of America', in which Creoles had been characterised, like
Indians, as lacking in reason. Noting that Creoles had recendy observed
with dismay the tendency of the crown to grant them fewer favours,
Rivadeneira went on to argue that to exclude Creoles from office was
'to overturn the law of peoples', and he declared 'die rights of the
native inhabitants to be appointed to offices in their own countries, not
only in preference to foreigners but to their exclusion'. European
Spaniards were not, Rivadeneira conceded, foreigners in the Indies
from a legal point of view, since they were, with Americans, part of
the same body politic under the single head of the Cadiolic Monarch.
However, unlike Americans, they did 'not derive their identity from
the Indies', since dieir homes, families, and ties were all in Old Spain
not New Spain. They were merely transients who were primarily
concerned 'to return wealthy to their own home and their native land'.
Nor was their tendency to use political offices as a means of personal
enrichment their only flaw. In countries with 'their own laws of
government' which Europeans had not studied, the metropolitan official
was incapable of good government because 'he comes to govern a
people he does not know, to administer laws he has not studied, to
encounter customs he does not understand, to deal with people he has
never met. And . . . he comes full of European ideas which do not
apply in these parts.' American Spaniards, on die other hand, were
2lJuan and Ulloa, Discourse and Political Reflections, 231-2.
"Ibid., 217.
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worthy of the highest office, since in 'talents, application, conduct and
honour, diey cede nothing to any of the other nations of the world'.23
This paeon of praise for Creoles, with its references to Creole parity
with other nations, was not an unabashed nationalism, however, since
it certainly did not embrace all Mexico's people. Rivadeneira made it
abundantly clear diat he was not speaking of the Indians or people of
mixed race who constituted the overwhelming majority of the population,
but only of'Spaniards born in diese regions' who traced unbroken descent
from conquerors and early colonists or from more recent Spanish immi-
grants, and 'whose blood is as pure as that of Spaniards from Old Spain'.
The Indians, by contrast, were 'victims of their race . . . born to poverty,
bred in destitution and controlled through punishment'.24 Here, then, was
a claim for the equality of Creoles and metropolitan Spaniards as members
of the same nation by virtue of dieir race, or 'purity of blood'. Indeed,
'purity of blood' was a deeply trditional Spanish concept: it derived from
the test of 'limpieza de sangre' which Spaniards had used in the sixteenth
century to discriminate against, and exclude from office 'New Christians'
ofjewish descent.
Creole exasperation at Bourbon realignments of policy did not stop
at verbal assertions of Creole identity and political rights of the kind
made by Rivadeneira. It was much more forcibly expressed in the
rebellions which confronted officials charged with implementing govern-
ment administrative and fiscal reforms during the reign of Charles III
(1759-88). Major rebellions occurred in the city of Quito in 1765, and
later, on a larger scale, in New Granada and Peru in 1780-2, when
lower-class protests against new fiscal demands fused with Creole
dissatisfaction with administrative and fiscal reform, and allowed Creoles
to use the sharp edge of popular protests to propel their own claims
for redress of grievances.25 In differing degrees, these rebellions all
reflected the way in which Bourbon policies activated the problem of
identity which lay at the heart of Spanish American colonial societies.
The incursions of the Bourbon state impinged upon botfi the political
audiority and economic interests of local Creole oligarchies, and, by
thus attacking the standing of Creoles in their own communities, led
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This rejection of Spanish identity was mirrored in attacks on metro-
politan Spaniards. The rebellions of Quito, New Granada and Peru all
revealed antagonism towards metropolitan Spaniards, sometimes
leading to violent attacks on their property and persons, and demands
for their expulsion. This was especially true of Peru and Upper Peru
where, during the great rebellion of 1780-2, Spaniards were singled out
for violent, systematic persecution. Tupac Amaru, die first rebel leader,
called for the expulsion or execution of European Spaniards, and his
followers enthusiastically executed his orders by killing 'Spaniards'
widiout discrimination between Europeans and Creoles. To justify such
slaughter, they invoked a powerful counter-image of 'Spaniards' as
traitors to Christianity and the Spanish King, and demonised them as
beasdy, devilish creatures who deserved inhuman treatment.26 The
rebellion was, moreover, informed by a current of Andean messianic
thinking in which anti-Spanish sentiments blended into visions of
restoring an Inca kingdom in Peru, ruled by descendants of the ancient
Inca dynasty which the Spaniards had deposed in the sixteenth century.
This phenomenon, which has been called 'Inca nationalism', was
peculiar to the southern Peruvian highlands, particularly in and around
the city of Cuzco.27 There, Indian caciques (nobles) and Creole families
who also claimed noble descent had underpinned dieir sense of group
identity and claims to autonomy from lima, die viceregal capital, by
rooting themselves in a mythologised Inca past. Harking back to an
Inca kingdom not only offered a respectable past; it provided an
alternative to Spanish monarchy that was in keeping with a traditional,
ancien regime belief in the necessity of kingship, while also providing a
means of mobilising support among die Indian peasantry. Here, then,
was a potent blend of Creole and indigenous cultural traditions which,
because it openly envisaged a new political order outside Spanish rule,
sets the Tupac Amaru rebellion apart from the creole-led rebellions of
Quito and New Granada. Its potential was severely limited, however.
The idea of an 'Inca kingdom', though never clearly formulated, was
possible in principle: Indian nobles were members of the privileged
classes in Peru, and Creoles and mestizos were often eager to emphasise
meir descent from, and family links with, the ancient Incan aristocracy,
since, in an ancien regime society, noble blood conferred both prestige
and prerogatives of power. But, if the idea that they might come
26Jan Szeminski, 'Why Kill the Spaniard? New Perspectives on Andean Insurrectionary
Ideology in the 18th Century' in Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant
World, 18th to 20th Centuries, ed. Steve Stern (Madison, Wisconsin, 1987), 166-92; on rebel
violence towards both Spaniards and non-Spaniards, see Scarlett O'Phelan Godoy, La
Gran Rebelim de los Andes: de Tupac Amaru a Tupac Catari (Lima, 1995), 105-37.
^John Rowe, 'El movimiento nacional inca del siglo XVffl', in Tupac Amaru II.
Antologia, ed. Alberto Flores Galindo (lima, 1976), 13-62.
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together in a state separate from that of Spain was possible in principle,
in practice, it had little appeal outside the Indian world. For, although
Tupac Amaru envisaged a place for Creoles and mestizos in his putative
kingdom, together with a continuing link to the Cadiolic King of Spain,
whites and mestizos found it difficult to take seriously the idea of rule
by an Indian rather than a Spanish king. Moreover, the widespread
edinic violence of the rebellion undermined alliances between Peruvians:
Creoles were terrified by Indian uprisings, while the Indian rebels—
themselves a heterogeneous force, divided by regional and ethnic
differences—were unable to find any unity of purpose, and were
defeated area by area.
So, although Creoles involved in the late eighteenth-century rebellions
asserted their identity as 'Americans' and explicitly demanded that
'Americans' should be given preference to metropolitans in the dis-
tribution of offices, their interpretation of the rights of native-born
whites did not generally indicate desire for independence from Spain.
It was, rather, a defence of the traditional notion of a 'pact' between
the king and his kingdoms, nurtured by the experience of the Habsburg
period; it aimed at perpetuating past practices, not overthrowing them.
Nor did such protest enlarge the scope for creating a general political
identity mat embraced not just Creoles but the other peoples of their
territories. Enmity towards metropolitan Spaniards was insufficiently
strong or widespread to underpin nationalistic sentiment or to provide
a focus for rebellion against Spain. The heart of the major rebellions
was found in the cities, towns and villages which were the primary
locus of social identity and political action in Spanish American societies,
and rebels rarely succeeded in transcending the concerns of those
communities. Essentially, the rebellions of the Comuneros in New
Granada and of Tupac Amaru in Peru were clusters of local insur-
rections, driven by divisions and disputes in local politics and only
briefly bound by any sense of allegiance to a wider common cause.
Thus, in all the late eighteendi-century rebellions, Creole coalitions with
lower-class rebels soon foundered, as fear of Indians and other people
of colour outweighed Creole dislike of Spaniards and Spanish policies.
Creoles involved in the rebellions saw the rights of 'Americans' as the
rights of Creoles within the Spanish 'nation', and were still far from
framing a cultural identity which embraced all the populations of their
territories, envisaged as potentially unified nations. Moreover, aside
from die concept of the Inca kingdom that was briefly promoted by
Tupac Amaru in 1780—i, die idea that the colonies might become
independent had yet to be voiced. Creole ideas about cultural identity
and political rights were still expressed in die political language of the
ancien regime, and, if Creoles accorded tiiemselves distinct identities within
die Spanish monarchy, they did not imagine themselves outside it. This
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occurred only after the ideas of the Enlightenment offered Creoles a
new medium for understanding and expressing their identity as Amer-
icans, and when the dissolution of the Spanish monarchy at its centre
provided them with the chance to turn their complaints against Spain
to demands for equality.
The part played by Enlightenment ideas in strengthening Creole identity
was noted by Alexander von Humboldt during his travels in Mexico
and South America in 1799—1804. Humboldt observed that following
the American and French revolutions, it had become increasingly
frequent for Creoles to assert that 'I am not a Spaniard, I am an American'.
This Humboldt attributed to 'the workings of a long resentment, which
arose from 'the abuse of laws, the false measures of the colonial
government, the example of the United States of America, and the
influence of opinions of the age .. ."8 These phrases draw attention to
the significance of the new elements which entered into the culture and
politics in the Spanish world in the closing decades of the century. As
the Bourbon reforms reached their apogee, die ideas of the European
Enlightenment began to circulate more widely and freely in Spanish
America. At the same time, news of the American and French Rev-
olutions entered America by official and unofficial channels during the
late 1780s and the 1790s, at a time when, thanks largely to a small but
burgeoning press, Creoles had unprecedented opportunities for receiving
news and absorbing new ideas from the world outside. But what were
the political implications and repercussions of this assertion of an
'Americanness' among Creoles? Did it signal the translation of a Creole
sense of cultural identity into a desire for political independence and
lead to the foundation of new nations?
One way in which Humboldt's 'opinions of the age' impacted on
Spanish American political culture was by supplying Creoles wim liberal
and republican ideas which direcdy inspired demands for political
independence grounded in appeals to universal human rights. As
evidence for this, historians have drawn attention to the penetration
into Spanish American of the writings of die philosophes, the circulation
of key texts from the American and French revolutions—such as the
Constitution of Philadelphia, the Federal Constitution, and die French
Declaration of the Rights of Man and die Citizen—and the activities
of that small but famous group of men—Francisco de Miranda, Antonio
Narino, and the Jesuit Juan Pablo Viscardo y Guzman—who dedicated
themselves to preaching and promoting independence from Spain.
Tracing the dissemination of ideas through books and the incubation
28
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of separatist sentiments through the careers of a few idealists is, however,
a flawed approach to understanding political change in late colonial
Spanish America. Reading about new philosophical principles and
political experiments was not the same as believing, or wanting to
implement them. Indeed, at the end of the century, only a tiny
number of Creoles took the American and French revolutions as models
applicable to Spanish America. The American War of Independence
seems to have passed virtually unnoticed in Spanish America at the
time that it was happening, even in New Granada and Peru where
major rebellions broke out in 1780-1. The French Revolution attracted
more attention among Creoles, partly because the official Spanish press
was so ready to draw attention to the impious horrors which flowed
from the overthrow of an anointed king. But the prospect of following
this revolutionary path excited only a tiny number of Creoles, whose
conspiracies were ill-conceived and unsuccessful, and whose idealism
found no wider resonance among either their fellow Creoles or the
larger populations.29 Moreover, early Creole revolutionists such as
Miranda and Nariflo were republicans rather dian nationalists. Their
concern was not simply to change government in Spanish America or
to affirm the rights of pre-existing Spanish American nations; it was,
rather, to overthrow the system of absolutist monarchy throughout the
Spanish world (including Spain itself), and to replace it with governments
based on the principles of popular sovereignty and consent of the
governed.
The inspiration that some Creoles took from the radical political
ideas of the Enlightenment was, then, only one way in which 'enlight-
ened' ideas influenced Creole thinking and behaviour. More important
were the slower, more subtle ways in which the Enlightenment emphasis
on reason, the rights of the individual, and the possibilities of human
progress altered Creoles' perceptions of themselves and undermined
their respect for Spanish cultural and intellectual leadership. And, if
diese new perceptions allowed Creoles to take a more critical approach
to their relations with the metropolitan power, equally important was
the development of new means of communicating and disseminating
such ideas.
The influence of enlightened thinking in sharpening Creole identity
came partly through contemporary scientific debate about the New
World which raised in new form the old issue of differences about
Europeans and Americans, and, by implication, the fitness of Creoles
for self-government. Denigration of the New World by European
*
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scientists such as Cornelius de Pauw, who drew highly unfavourable
comparisons between the Old and the New World, brought educated
Creoles to the defence of the American environment, focused their
interest in the geography and resources of the regions they inhabited,
and thereby stimulated their sense of identity with the lands of their
birth.30 Modern scientific thinking invigorated Creole thinking in other
ways, too. Reform of university curricula, designed to introduce the
'useful sciences' into the colonies, exposed Creoles in leading cities to
new ways of thinking as well as creating new areas for contention with
European Spaniards. For, while the academic establishment, dominated
by the regular orders with their roots in Spain defended the old ways,
Creoles who were seeking academic positions tended to align with the
currents of reform.3' But perhaps most important was that the new
emphasis on improving communication with Spain and disseminating
'useful knowledge' promoted the development of a periodical press
which also provided a medium for criticising Spain and for cultivating
the American side of Creole identity through new circuits of debate and
sociability.32 Although they seem bland politically, the new periodicals
published in the major colonial cities made an important contribution
to the elaboration and diffusion of new attitudes and ideas. They took
up the practice, started by Bourbon officials early in the eighteenth
century, of criticising traditional ways and calling for the elite to take
up reform, while at the same time strengthening a sense of regional
identity by directing news and comment to specific regional audiences.
The Gazeta de Guatemala, the Papel Periodico de Santafi de Bogota, the
TeUgrafo Mercantil of Buenos Aires, the Mercurio Peruano, and so on, aimed
at readers who, in the act of reading news of the region, became
members of a public identified with it. Editors and authors also assumed
that there was a 'public good' which might rationally be pursued, and
addressed an 'enlightened' public in the belief that it should promote
the public good. In their articles on such topics as improvements to
economic life, these journals employed a 'modern' style of criticism,
30
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which stressed the superiority of empirical investigation of nature
over the repetition of texts invested with only traditional authority.
Contributors also reformulated the claims of Creoles to participate in
government, by stressing the need for educated men to shape and
dictate policy. This argument is reflected in explicit attacks on the
principles of 'nobility' and family honour, conferred by birth, which
stood at the heart of traditional elite political culture. Instead, Creole
writers proposed an alternative form of nobility, based on merit and
the exercise of talent for the public good.33 The idea of replacing an
'aristocracy' with a species of'meritocracy' was in effect a modernisation
of Creole claims to exercise influence and power in their own land,
restated in die language of die Enlightenment.
These claims all lend weight to Anderson's proposal diat die arrival
of print capitalism in Spanish America played a key part in shaping
Creole nationalism. In his view, the provincial periodicals which were
printed in late colonial Spanish America, widi their juxtaposition of
commercial news, news of events in the world outside, and items
pertaining to local society and government appointments, ensured mat,
when Creoles broke widi Spain, they thought of their regions as
nations. Because diese periodicals were published in and for a specific
community and aimed at local readers, diey were conducive to the
formation of a sense of territorial community; secondly, diey provided
forums of information and discussion which, although often politically
innocent, were in time politicised. Thus die presses of colonial Spanish
America completed the role played by Creole functionaries in shaping
die image of the proto-national community which was to assert its
interests against die metropolitan power.34 But, if Creoles' confidence in
dieir separate identity and in die potential for economic and social
progress in dieir homelands grew stronger towards the end of die
century, did it build into a sense of 'national' identity capable of
generating movements of independence and building new states?
There are several reasons for doubting diis. First, it is easy to
exaggerate die importance of die press as a force for shaping a proto-
national community. It may well be true that diese publications
generated a more intense Creole consciousness, but diis effect was
concentrated in die very restricted circles of an educated Creole minority
concentrated in leading cities, and did not spread far beyond dieir
ranks. There were some scientific savants and endiusiasts for enlightened
ideas in the provinces. In New Granada, for example, Creoles educated
33
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in the viceregal capital at Bogota returned to the provinces but kept
up contact with new ideas through correspondence;35 in Mexico, the
provincial parish priest Miguel Hidalgo (later the leader of a rebellion
against Spanish rule in 1810) was another striking example of the
spread of enlightened ideas beyond a colonial capital.36 Nonetheless, if
enlightened ideas had reshaped attitudes within the educated minority
of the Creole elites, older structures of thought and feeling continued
to prevail within the wider ranks of Creole society, particularly in the
many small provincial towns where the influence of universities and
the new periodical press was slight. Nor had new ideas diminished
identification with local communities. In New Granada, for example,
concern to promote economic and social progress during the 1790s and
early 1800s was conceived largely in terms of local interests. Prominent
members of the cabildo and consulado (the municipal and commercial
corporations) of Cartagena de Indias, New Granada's principal port,
focused on promoting their own commercial connections with the
exterior, and paid little attention the needs of the interior. Towns and
cities inland in turn sought to diminish Cartagena's privileges, and
pressed the government for policies designed to further their interests.37
The influence of new ideas did not, then, necessarily mould Creoles
into a proto-national community, much less unite them with other
social and ethnic groupings in a shared sense of cultural identity. What
such ideas did was, rather, to strengthen the self-consciousness and
inflate the aspirations of Creole patricians in the capital cities of the
audiencias; as the leading groups in such cities, these Creoles later
became 'nationalist' to the extent that diey presumed to inherit the
power which the high-ranking royal officials who were their social peers
exercised over the territories of the audiencias. In provincial towns,
Creoles clung to localised identities with their towns and their hin-
terlands, identities which did not necessarily translate into a sense of
affinity with the jurisdictions of the larger political entities established
under Spanish rule.
Nor did the development of a sense of autonomous cultural identity
among Creoles lead inexorably to demands for a separate, independent
political status. So long as Spain remained politically stable, Creoles'
defence of their character as Americans, their exaltation of the American
environment, and criticism of Spanish government were all comfortably
contained within the existing political structure. Even when Spain's
economic and political power was visibly deteriorating after the end of
35
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the Peace of Amens in 1804, and when leading Creoles had increasing
reason for complaining about Spain's commercial and fiscal policies,
the threat that Creoles would rebel against the parent power was slight.38
Evidently, the incipient 'nationalism' among the Creole elites of colonial
capitals was insufficiently powerful to propel Creoles into the political
organisation needed to demand equality with, or independence from
the metropolis. That was achieved only after Napoleon's seizure of the
Spanish throne in 1808 collapsed the Spanish state at its centre and
provoked a crisis throughout the empire. But, if external events rather
than internal developments provoked political change, why did Spanish
America become a series of nation-states, each with a republican,
representative form of government?
This was, Anderson rightly argues, a precocious development, ante-
dating the emergence of nation-states in most of Europe. Seeing this
as an early expression of nationalism, Anderson seeks to explain it in
largely cultural terms: he suggests that the roots of the nation lay in
Creole cultural identities formed under colonial rule, in the 'imagined
community' created by Creole functionaries and consolidated by the
effects of print-capitalism. Francois Xavier Guerra also stresses the
precocity of Spanish America, in setting up some of the first modern
political regimes, adopting national sovereignty as a legitimating prin-
ciple and creating the representative republic as a form of government;
however, he advances a different, more historically sensitive explanation
for the early creation of nation-states in Spanish America. According
to Guerra, the transition into nation-states had a fundamental political
logic. It began as a quest to legitimise defence of the traditional
order by proclaiming that, in the absence of the legitimate monarch,
sovereignty temporarily reverted to the 'people' with whom the monarch
had, in the terms of traditional Hispanic political thought, formed a
'pact'. Once it was accepted that legitimacy could only be based in
society, representation of the 'people' became necessary. Debating
representation then prompted debate about who the 'people' were, and
what constituted the 'nation'. As this debate unfolded, Creole demands
for autonomy, based in the traditional 'pactist' political thinking of the
colonial period and justified by a traditional notion of popular sov-
ereignty, took on new coloration, influenced by the republican principles
of the French Revolution. Defining the 'people' meant creating the
'nation', and thus, as Spanish Americans sought to find representative
38
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forms of government, so they engendered nation-states.39
The transition from defence of the established order into development
of nation states was driven, as Guerra shows, by a search for a means
of legitimating Spanish resistance to France. Started in Spain itself, this
continued in Spanish America with a defence by Creole patricians of
the Spanish nation against France that was rooted in a Spanish patriotism
founded in a common language, culture and religion. Thus, for the
first two years of the Spanish crisis, political mobilisation in Spanish
America initially moved along lines similar to, and largely inspired by,
the emergency political reorganisation which took place in Spain itself.40
There, the war of independence against France was founded first on
the corporate groupings of ancien regime society. In the absence of the
legitimate king, Ferdinand VII, sovereignty was claimed to have reverted
to the people (the pueblo), but the powers of the sovereign people were
taken up by juntas which were largely extensions of traditional municipal
corporations and were run by local notables.4' And, when the Central
Junta, focus of Spain's resistance to Napoleon, sought to gather support
for their cause in the Americas, they instituted the election of American
deputies using the traditional criteria of corporate representation prac-
tised in the ancien regime Spanish monarchy: the deputies were chosen
by, and from the ranks of, urban notables, who received from their
cities power to act as spokesmen for the wider communities which were
subject to these cities.
Creoles participated enthusiastically in these elections of 1809,
showing their firm commitment both to the Spanish nation and to the
political concepts of ancien regime society. But Creole loyalty was soon
undermined when government in Spain proved unwilling to accord
equality of representation to the overseas dominions. Now the old
problem of equality between European and American Spaniards, which
had long centred on the issue of access to public office, came to the
centre of political debate, and led Creoles to assert their rights to self-
government through autonomous juntas like those of Spain. Throughout
Spanish America, Creoles called for the establishment of governments
which would represent the 'people' to whom sovereignty had reverted,
then moved, from 1810, towards the principle of national representation
based in a community of citizens.42
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The sense of Creole identity formed under colonial rule and sharpened
by the effects of Bourbon policy played a part in this process of political
and ideological change, but it did not easily translate into nationalism
or result in the foundation of 'emotionally plausible and politically
viable' nation-states. Only in Mexico were demands for autonomous
government quickly linked to the revindication of the rights of an
existing 'nation', when, in 1810 die priest Miguel Hidalgo raised a great
popular revolt under the banner of the Virgin of Guadalupe, and called
for the expulsion of European Spaniards, in the name of a 'Mexican
nation' which had been oppressed by Spain. Under Morelos, the
country cleric who succeeded Hidalgo, rebellion became a prolonged
insurgency whose intellectual spokesmen proclaimed the existence of a
Mexican nation ready for independence and called for ethnic equality
in which all people, regardless of their edinic origins, would share an
identity as Americans. Thus, it is said, 'creole patriotism, which began
as die articulation of die social identity of American Spaniards, was
here transmuted into die insurgent ideology of Mexican nationalism'.43
If, however, the ideologues of Mexico's insurgency conjured up a
nationalist rhetoric, it was of a peculiar kind, deeply influenced by
religious conservatism and die desire to protect the privileges of die
Church. The insurgency flourished in only a few regions of Mexico,
where it took its energy from local social and political conflicts and die
desire of local groups to take advantage of the crisis of the state for
dieir own ends, radier dian from any identification widi die 'Mexican
nation'.44
In Spanish Soudi America, identifying die 'people' and die 'nation',
and creating 'emotionally plausible and politically viable' nation-states,
was also fraught widi problems.45 In some areas, fear of die 'people'
long inhibited political change. The Viceroyalty of Peru, for example,
remained under royalist control largely because Creoles feared a recrud-
escence of edinic warfare of die kind diat had occurred in Tupac
Amaru's rebellion. In odier areas, where creole leaders set up auton-
omous governments based on popular sovereignty, die absence of any
widespread sense of commitment to a 'nation' quickly became apparent.
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When Creoles sought to define their new condition in proclamations
and written constitutions, they were rarely intent on locating an historic
'nation' to legitimate projects for independent states.46 Indeed, in many
regions, Creoles had no myths of a glorious Indian past to which to turn.
The absence of any sense of an underlying 'national' unity was also
apparent, after 1810, in die civil wars which not only set the defenders
of the old order against its challengers, but also pitted newly autonomous
cities and towns against each other. For, having cast off Spanish
command, their leaders often refused to acknowledge the authority of
new governments which attempted to inherit the central command
previously exercised by the capitals of viceroyalties, audiencias and
captaincies-general from which Spanish officials had once ruled. Such
divisions have been attributed to Creole political inexperience. Bolivar,
for example, thought that die failure of the patriot cause in Venezuela
and New Granada was due to a political naivete which meant that
'Each province governed itself independendy; and, following this
example, each city demanded like powers, based on die practices of
die provinces and on the tfieory that all men and all peoples are
entitled to establish arbitrarily die form of government diat pleases
diem'.47 Bolivar repeated the point in his famous 'Jamaica Letter', in
which he stated that America had not been ready for secession, and
had 'risen rapidly, widiout previous knowledge of, and, what is more
regrettable, without previous experience in public affairs .. .'48 But
such political fragmentation was not so much die result of political
inexperience as an extension of the political experience common in
Spanish America under colonial rule. For, as we observed above,
political life had focused primarily on towns and cities during die
colonial period, and die habit of asserting local autonomy and pursuing
local interests died hard. Thus, aldiough leaders like Bolivar insisted
on the importance of creating a sense of nation which would override
odier ties, die Creoles who provided local leadership were unable to see
dieir political struggle as embedded in a people who shared a history
and culture.49 If Creoles shared a sense of affinity and identity, diis did
*
6Venezuela moved quickly to secession, and in 1811 became the first, very short-lived
independent republic in Spanish America. Elsewhere constitutions of a republican kind
were drawn up without declarations of independence from Spain. Excellent examples of
such constitutions are found in Manuel Antonio Pombo and Jose Joaquin Guerra (eds),
Constitucianes de Colombia (2 vols, Bogota, 1951).
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not easily extend to other edinic groups, nor beyond the boundaries of
their own cities. The first movements towards independence foundered
on this disunity; lack of common cause among the 'patriots' allowed
Ferdinand VII to reaffirm his authority over most of Spanish America
with only a moderate military effort. There were no 'nations-in-arms'
to defy Spanish reconquest, only city and regional governments which
commanded dwindling allegiance and scarce resources, and by 1816
the River Plate region was the only major territory that remained
outside royalist rule.
In the event, restoration of royal control was short-lived. This was
not, however, a sign that incipient nations, forged in the crucible of
war, rose from the ashes of defeat. For, while renewed resistance to
Spain owed sometiiing to die sense of freedom kindled in the first phase
of independence in 1810-15, the political errors and weaknesses of the
restored royalist regime played a large part in provoking the empire's
second collapse. In Spain, Ferdinand's absolutism won brief popular
acclaim but few lasting adherents, while his policy towards Spanish
America was ill-informed, poorly conceived, and badly financed.50 In
1820, the struggle between absolutists and liberals in Spain pushed die
metropolis into another political crisis, which, combined with die efforts
of 'patriot' guerrillas and generals in America, reopened die way
towards independence. Power was, however, usually seized at die top,
by military leaders whose power came more from dieir successes in
arms than from the popularity of dieir political ideas.
The new states were generally inaugurated amidst fanfares of opti-
mistic and reformist rhetoric, as die heirs of die Creole enlightenment
sought to create nation-states in which centralised, neo-Bourbonist
governments would reform society from above, along lines learned
from die Enlightenment. But die political ideals of die Enlightenment
enthusiastically espoused by men like Bolivar did not fit easily into die
social, political and cultural contexts of Spanish America. 'Bolivar's
patria' was, as Pagden points out, 'an "Enlightened Illusion" . . . gen-
erated by a body of texts';5' as such, it did not command much
understanding or commitment outside die small circles of educated and
Europeanised elites in the leading South American cities. And, however
much diey tried to create a sense of collective, national identity, die
Creole liberals' political projects attracted scant support.52 Indeed,
50
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5JOn efforts to replace colonial with republican images and rituals in Mexico, see
Annick Lemperiere, 'Nation moderna o repiiblica barroca? Mexico, 1823-1857' in
Imaginar la Nacidn, ed. Francois-Xavier Guerra and Monica Quijada (AHILA, Cuadernos
de Historia, Miinster and Hamburg, 1994), 135^77; on New Granada, Hans-Joachim
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centralist reformers intent on promoting their project for reform pro-
voked antagonism among provincial elites who wanted government to
express their identity and interests, while also failing to find popular
support, since the political and legal reforms of the new regimes had
little practical meaning to the common people.53 In 1815, after the first
failures to achieve independence, Bolivar had likened the state of
America in 1810-15 to diat of Rome after its fall, when 'each part of
Rome adopted a political system conforming to its interest . . . or
was led by the individual ambitions of certain chiefs, dynasties or
associations'.54 And, for all Bolivar's efforts to prevent it, the new states
which emerged after the second crisis of the Spanish monarchy in 1820,
when Ferdinand was forced to return to constitutional government,
generally followed the same pathway into fragmentation and civil
conflict between warring provinces.
Such fragmentation cannot be attributed to a failure among Creole
leaders to imagine the political future of their countries as nation-states.
The fusion of Creole patriotism with the ideals of the Enlightenment
had nurtured an American identity, the experience of 'patriotic' war
against 'foreign' Spaniards had promoted projects for independent
states, and the republican ideals of popular sovereignty and equal
citizenship legitimated the constitutional bases of independent states.
Moreover, die construction of the new liberal states was not solely the
work of urban Creole elites. For, recent revisionists insist, the peasantry
in Mexico and Peru were willing to adopt the political language of the
Creole elites and to engage in the politics of the new states for
their own purposes, and thereby shared in national political life and
contributed to shaping the nation-state.55 But, if it is true diat the
new nation-states of Mexico and Peru developed from processes of
negotiation across class and ethnic lines, it is equally true diat generating
a sense of national identity continued to be highly problematic in
Koenig, 'Simbolos nacionales y retorica politica en la independencia: El caso de la Nueva
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countries where, under Spanish colonial rule, people had acquired
social and cultural identities which tended to separate rather than unite
them, and where post-independence political leaders invariably reflected
the outlook of social elites which, while they proclaimed a shared
national identity, continued to see the social order as an ethnic hierarchy.
Their idea of a nation was based in the identity which the white elites
had formed under colonial rule, and, by failing to encompass the
ethnic diversity of their countries, proved too narrow to underpin the
foundations of any shared sense of commitment to new nation states.
The frailty of Spanish America's newly independent states was soon
reflected in civil conflicts, as caudillos asserted family and regional
interests, federalists fought centralists, and conservatives fought liberals.
Frustrated by such turbulence, the 'enlightened' Creoles who tried to
build nation-states based on the sovereignty of the people and equality
of individual rights were often persuaded that political problems in the
new states derived from the inherent incapacity of some of their
fellow citizens. Just as 'enlightened' eighteenth-century Europeans had
denigrated Creoles as racial and cultural inferiors who were incapable
of running their own affairs, so 'enlightened' nineteenth-century Creoles
maligned people of mixed race and Indians as incapable of becoming
responsible, economically productive citizens. And, just as eighteenth-
century Europeans based their views of Americans on the authority of
contemporary biologists, so nineteenth-century Creoles appealed to the
equally spurious scientific authority of an emerging Social Darwinism.56
Ironically, moulding nations from native materials seemed so difficult
that some creole statesmen concluded that the nation state could only
be secured on the basis of European immigration, or even, in the eyes
of some disillusioned politicians, through absorption into die United
States. Affirmation of Creole identity had facilitated a transition from
colonial to independent status and, once formed, the newly independent
states had widened die basis of political participation and encouraged
commitment to the 'national' order. But nationalism was not yet a
hegemonic concept capable of overcoming division; indeed, the efforts
of centralising creole elites to impose their vision of the nation was
often itself divisive. The new liberal states continued to be fundamentally
the creation of creole elites who saw 'reform from above' on the
Enlightenment model as die path to die future, and they had yet fully
to translate dieir affirmation of American equality widi Europe into a
56
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broader inclusion of the many identities within their ethnically diverse
societies. Thus the problems of building a political order based on a
clearly defined territory, a sense of political community and shared,
national values continued into the nineteenth century and, in some
regions, extended into the twentieth.57
"David A. Brading, 'Nationalism and State-Building in Latin American History' in
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